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ABSTRACT
As an essential processing step in computer vision applications, im-
age resizing or scaling, more specifically downsampling, has to be
applied before feeding a normally large image into a convolutional
neural network (CNN) model because CNN models typically take
small fixed-size images as inputs. However, image scaling functions
could be adversarially abused to perform a newly revealed attack
called image-scaling attack, which can affect a wide range of com-
puter vision applications building upon image-scaling functions.
This work presents an image-scaling attack detection frame-
work, termed as Decamouflage. Decamouflage consists of three
independent detection methods: (1) rescaling, (2) filtering/pooling,
and (3) steganalysis. While each of these three methods is efficient
standalone, they can work in an ensemble manner not only to im-
prove the detection accuracy but also to harden potential adaptive
attacks. Decamouflage has a pre-determined detection threshold
that is generic. More precisely, as we have validated, the threshold
determined from one dataset is also applicable to other different
datasets. Extensive experiments show that Decamouflage achieves
detection accuracy of 99.9% and 99.8% in the white-box (with the
knowledge of attack algorithms) and the black-box (without the
knowledge of attack algorithms) settings, respectively. To corrob-
orate the efficiency of Decamouflage, we have also measured its
run-time overhead on a personal PC with an i5 CPU and found
that Decamouflage can detect image-scaling attacks in milliseconds.
Overall, Decamouflage can accurately detect image scaling attacks
in both white-box and black-box settings with acceptable run-time
overhead.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Deep learning models have shown impressive success in solving
various tasks [8, 11, 26, 28]. One representative domain is the com-
puter vision that is eventually the impetus for the current deep
learning wave [11]. The convolutional neural network (CNN) mod-
els are widely used in the vision domain because of its superior
performance [8, 10, 11]. However, it has been shown that deep learn-
ing models are vulnerable to various adversarial attacks. Hence,
significant research efforts have been directed to defeat the main
stream of adversarial attacks such as adversarial samples [4, 24],
backdooring [7, 15], and inference [5, 13].
Xiao et al. [27] introduced a new attack called image-scaling at-
tack (also referred to as camouflage attack) that potentially affects all
applications using scaling algorithms as an essential pre-processing
step, where the attacker’s goal is to create attack images presenting
a different meaning to humans before and after a scaling operation.
This attack would be a serious security concern for computer vision
applications. Unlike adversarial examples, this attack is independent
of machine learning models and data. The attack indeed happens
before models consume inputs, and hence this type of attack af-
fects a wide range of applications with various machine learning
models using image scaling functions. Furthermore, crafted attack
images can be used to poison the training data that are typically
contributed by third parties or volunteers—a common practice to
curate data—that readily enables backdoor attacks when the model
is trained over poisoned data (see a detailed example in Section 2.2).
Herein, the image-scaling attack can be used to generate poisoned
images bypassing human inspection efficiently because its content
and label are consistent visually. Consequently, considering the
sequence raised by image-scaling attack, efficient countermeasures
are urgently demanded. Below we first give a concise example of
the image-scaling attack.
Image-scaling attack example. Input of CNN models typi-
cally takes fixed-size images such as 224× 224× 3 (representing the
height, width, and the number of color channels) so as to reduce
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the complexity of computations [8]. However, the size of raw input
images can be varied or become much larger (e.g., 800 × 600) than
this fixed-size. Therefore, the resizing or downscaling process is a
must before feeding such larger images into an underlying CNN
model. Xiao et al. [27] revealed that the image-scaling process is
vulnerable to the image-scaling attack, where an attacker inten-
tionally creates an attack image which is visually similar to a base
image for humans but recognized as a target image by the CNN
model after image-scaling function (e.g., resizing or downscaling)
is applied to the attack image. Figure 1 illustrates an example of
image-scaling attacks. The ‘wolf’ image is disguised delicately into
the ‘sheep’ image to form an attack image. When the attack im-
age is down-sampled/resized, the ‘sheep’ pixels are discarded, and
the ‘wolf’ image is finally presented. General, image-scaling attack
abuses an inconsistent understanding of the same image between
humans and machines.
Figure 1: Example of image-scaling attacks presenting a de-
ceiving effect. The left image showswhat human sees before
the scaling operation and the right image shows what the
CNN model sees after the scaling operation.
The strength of the image-scaling attack is its independence on
CNN models and data — it requires no knowledge of training data
and the model because it mainly exploits the image scaling func-
tion used for pre-processing. For image-scaling attacks, only the
knowledge about the used image-scaling function is required. It is
noted that the attacker can relatively easily obtain this information
because a small number of well-known image scaling functions
(e.g., nearest-neighbor, bilinear, and bicubic interpolation methods)
are commonly used for real-world services, and a small number of
input sizes (e.g., 224 × 224 and 32 × 32) are used for representative
CNNmodels [27], as shown in Table 1. Furthermore, the parameters
for the image-scaling function can be exposed to the public in some
services. Nonetheless, even when the parameter information is not
provided explicitly, it is feasible to infer the function parameter in-
formation used in a target service with API queries under a limited
trial by an attacker [27].
Table 1: Input sizes for popular cnn models.
Model Size
(pixels * pixels)
LeNet-5 32 * 32
VGG, ResNet, GoogleNet, MobileNet 224 * 224
AlexNet 227 * 227
Inception V3/V4 299 * 299
DAVE-2 Self-Driving 200 * 66
The image-scaling attacks can target various surfaces. First, as an
evasive attack, the attack images crafted via image-scaling attacks
can achieve the attack effect similar to adversarial examples with
an advantage of agnostic to underlying CNN models. Second, the
attack image can be exploited for data poisoning to insert a backdoor
into any model trained over the poisonous data (see Section 2.2).
Unlike other adversarial attacks where corresponding counter-
measures have been well investigated, only one study suggested
defense mechanisms against image scaling attacks. Quiring et al.
[18] first analyzed the root cause of image scaling attacks and pro-
posed two defense mechanisms, (1) use of robust scaling algorithms
and (2) image reconstruction, to prevent image-scaling attacks by
delicately exploiting the relationship between the downsampling
frequency and the convolution kernel used for smoothing pixels.
The proposed defense mechanism sanitizes those pixels, which
renders the image-scaling attack technique unable to inject target
pixels with the required quality. However, their defense approaches
have the following downsides. First, the use of robust scaling al-
gorithms is likely to cause backward compatibility problems with
existing scaling algorithms in OpenCV and TensorFlow. Moreover,
as Quiring et al. [18] mentioned, small artifacts from an attack image
can remain even after applying their suggested scaling algorithms,
as the manipulated pixels are not cleansed and still contribute to
the scaling. Second, the image reconstruction method removes the
set of pixels in the attack images and reconstructs those pixels with
image filters. This approach would significantly decrease the attack
chance, but it can inherently degrade the quality of input images
for CNN models.
To obviate image quality degradation and potential incompat-
ibility with prevention mechanisms, we focused on developing a
solution to detect attack images regarding the image-scaling attack,
including one novel angle e.g., treating the image-scaling attack as
a kind of steganography for information hiding. We aim to develop
a defense mechanism to detect attack images only without any
modifications to input images for CNN models. Also, we develop
Decamouflage as an independent module compatible with any ex-
isting scaling algorithms—alike a plug-in protector. Furthermore,
Decamouflage is designed for detecting attack images crafted via
image-scaling attacks even under black-box settings where there is
no prior information about the attack algorithm.
Our key contributions are summarized as follows:
• Decamouflage is the first practical solution to detect image-
scaling attacks.We develop three different detectionmethods
(scaling, filtering, and steganalysis) and construct Decam-
ouflage as an ensemble of those methods. Each method can
be deployed individually and eventually work together as
complementary to each other to maximize the detection ac-
curacy. Our source code is released at https://github.com/
anynymous/Decamouflage1.
• We identify three fundamental metrics (mean squared errors
(MSE), structural similarity index (SSIM), and centered spec-
trum points (CSP)) that can be used to distinguish benign
images from attack images generated by image-scaling at-
tacks. Those metrics would also be applicable for continuous
research in the line of detecting attack images.
• We empirically validate the feasibility of Decamouflage for
both the white-box setting (with the knowledge of the at-
tacker’s algorithm) and the black-box setting (without the
1The artifacts including source code will be released upon the publication.
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knowledge of the attacker’s algorithm). We demonstrate that
Decamouflage can be effective in both settings with experi-
mental results.
• We evaluate the detection performance of Decamouflage us-
ing an unseen testing dataset to show its practicality. We
used the “NeurIPS 2017 Adversarial Attacks and Defences
Competition Track” image dataset [12] to find the optimal
thresholds for Decamouflage and used the “Caltech 256” im-
age dataset [17] for testing. To implement image-scaling
attacks, we use the code released in the original work by
Xiao et al. [27]. The experimental results demonstrate that
Decamouflage achieves detection accuracy of 99.9% with a
false acceptance rate of 0.2% and a false rejection rate of 0.0%
in the white-box setting, and detection accuracy of 99.8%
with a false acceptance rate of 0.3% and a false rejection rate
of 0.1% even in the black-box setting. In addition, the run-
time overhead of Decamouflage is less than 174 milliseconds
on average evaluated with a personal PC with an Intel Core
i5-7500 CPU (3.41GHz) and 8GB memory, indicating that
Decamouflage can be deployed for online detection.
2 BACKGROUND
In this section, we provide the prior knowledge for the image-
scaling attack and its enabled insidious backdoor attack.
2.1 Image-Scaling Attack
The preprocessing steps for input images in a typical deep learning
pipeline is an essential stage. Recently, Xiao et al. [27] demonstrated
a practical adversarial attack targeting the scaling functions used
by widely used deep learning frameworks. The attack exploited the
fact that deep learning-based models accept only small fixed-size
input images. As presented in Table 1, nine popular deep learning
models are summarized, and they all use a fixed input scale during
both training and inference phases. In practice, images are often
captured on larger dimensions than what models expect; therefore,
downscaling operations are necessary for such situations. Thus
an adversary has the chance to modify an image to adversarially
change its content seen by the model after undergoing downscaling.
Figure 2: Overall process of an image-scaling attack. An ad-
versary creates an attack image 𝐴 (tampered sheep image)
such that it looks like 𝑂 (original sheep image) to humans,
but it is recognized as 𝑇 (targeted wolf image) by CNN mod-
els after applying image scaling operations. Here 𝑋 ≈ 𝑌 rep-
resents that 𝑋 looks similar to 𝑌 .
One example is illustrated in Figure 2, where a wolf is disguised
into a sheep image. The human sees sheep, but the model sees a wolf
once the tampered sheep image undergoes the downsampling step.
More precisely, the adversary slightly alters an original image𝑂 so
that the obtained attack image 𝐴 = 𝑂 + Δ resembles a target image
𝑇 once downscaled. The attack mechanism can be demonstrated as
the following quadratic optimization problem:
𝑚𝑖𝑛( | |Δ| |22) 𝑠 .𝑡 . | |𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑒 (𝑂 + Δ) −𝑇 | |∞ ≤ 𝜖 (1)
Also, each pixel value of 𝐴 needs to be maintained within the
fixed range (e.g., [0,255] for 8-bit images). This problem can be
solved with Quadratic Programming (QP) [7]. The successful attack
criteria are that the obtained image 𝐴 should be visually similar
to the original image 𝑂 , but the downscaled output 𝐷 should be
recognized as the target image 𝑇 after scaling. In other words, the
attack has to satisfy two properties:
• The resultant attack image 𝐴 should be visually indistin-
guishable from the original image 𝑂 (𝐴 ≈ 𝑂).
• The output image 𝐷 downscaled from the attack image 𝐴
should be recognized as the target image 𝑇 by CNN models
(𝑇 ≈ 𝐷).
2.2 Image-Scaling Attack Assisted Backdooring
The image-scaling attack greatly facilities backdoor attack that is
one emerging security threat to current ML pipeline. The back-
doored model behaves the same to its counterpart, the clean model,
in the absence of the trigger [6]. However, the backdoored model is
hijacked to misclassify any input with the trigger to the attacker’s
target label. This newly revealed backdoor attack does need to
tamper the model to insert the backdoor first. The attack surface
of the backdoor is regarded wide: data poisoning is among one
main attack surface [6]. In this context, the user collects data from
many sources, e.g., public or contributed by volunteers or third
parties. Since the data sources could be malicious or compromised,
the curated data could be poisoned. Image-scaling attack facilitates
data poisoning attack to insert a backdoor into the CNN model [6],
which was already demonstrated explicitly by Quiring et al. [20].
Here, we exemplify this backdoor attack using face recognition.
First, the attacker randomly selects a number of images from differ-
ent persons, e.g., Alice, Bob. The attacker also chooses black-frame
eye-glass as the backdoor trigger. Second, the attacker poisons both
Alice and Bob face images by stamping the trigger—these poisonous
images afterward referred to as trigger images. Third, assisted with
an image-scaling attack, the attacker disguises the trigger image
into administer’s image—this means the targeted person of the
backdoor attack is the administer. A number of attack/poisoned
images are crafted and submitted to the data aggregator/user. As
the attack image’s content is consistent with its label – the attack
image still visually indistinguishable from the administer’s face,
the data aggregator cannot identify the attack image. Fourthly, the
user trains a CNN model over the collected data. In this context, the
attack images seen by the model are trigger images. Therefore, the
CNN model is backdoored, which learns a sub-task that associates
the trigger with the administer. During the inference phase, when
any person, e.g., Eve, wears the black-frame eye-glass indicating a
Conference’17, July 2017, Washington, DC, USATrovato and Tobin, et al., Bedeuro Kim, Alsharif Abuadbba, Yansong Gao, Yifeng Zheng, Muhammad Ejaz Ahmed, Hyoungshick Kim, and Surya Nepal
trigger, the face recognition system will misclassify Eve into the
administer.
3 POTENTIAL DETECTION METHODS: KEY
INSIGHTS
To proactively defeat the image-scaling attack, one would first
identify potential methods from different angles. Therefore, the
first research question (RQ) is as below.
RQ. 1: What are the potential methods to reveal the target
image embedded by the image-scaling attack?
This work identifies three efficient methods and visualizes their
ability to detect that attack. Here we provide a general concept for
each method. We exchangeably use the terms original image and
benign image in the rest of this paper.
3.1 Method 1: Scaling Detection
We first explore the potential of reverse-engineering the attack
process. In the attack process, the attack image 𝐴 is downsampled
to the output image 𝐷 to be recognized as 𝑇 for CNN models.
Therefore, we need to upscale the output image 𝐷 to the upscaled
image 𝑆 in the reverse engineering process. Based on the reverse
engineering process, we design an image-scaling attack detection
method as follows. Given an input image 𝐼 (which can potentially
be an attack image) for a CNN model, we apply the downscaling
and upscaling operations in sequence to obtain the image 𝑆 and
measure the similarity between 𝐼 and 𝑆 . Our intuition is that if the
input image 𝐼 is a benign image (i.e., the original image 𝑂), 𝑆 will
remain similar to 𝐼 ; otherwise, 𝑆 would be significantly different
from 𝐼 (see Figure 3).
Xiao et al. [27] suggested the color histogram as an image sim-
ilarity metric for detecting attack images without conducting ex-
periments. However, we found that the color histogram is not a
valid metric for the purpose of detecting image-scaling attacks. Our
observation is consistent with the results in [20]. Therefore, it is
challenging to find a proper metric to distinguish the case of attack
images from benign images. We will discuss this issue in Section 4.
3.2 Method 2: Filtering Detection
The image-scaling attack relies on embedding the target image
pixels within the original image pixels to avoid human visual in-
spection by abusing image scaling functions. Therefore, if we use
image filters to remove noises, the embedded target image pixels
might be removed or affected because the embedded target image
pixels would be significantly different from the original image pix-
els. Figure 4 shows the results of an attack image after applying
the minimum filter [21], the median filter, and the maximum filter,
respectively.2 We can see that the minimum filter reveals the target
image compared with the other filters.
Based on this observation, we suggest another image-scaling
attack detection method. Given an input image 𝐼 (which can poten-
tially be an attack image) for a CNNmodel, we apply an image filter
to obtain the image 𝐹 and measure the similarity between 𝐼 and 𝐹 .
Our intuition is that if the input image 𝐼 is a benign image (i.e., the
2We used the OpenCV image filtering APIs (see https://docs.opencv.org/2.4/modules/
imgproc/doc/filtering.html).
(a) Benign case.
(b) Attack case.
Figure 3: Overview of the scaling detection method. We ob-
tained the upscaled image 𝑆 from the downscaled image 𝐷
and then measured the image similarity between 𝑆 and the
input image 𝐼 . If the input image 𝐼 is a benign image (i.e., orig-
inal image 𝑂), 𝑆 will remain similar to 𝐼 ; otherwise, 𝑆 would
be significantly different from 𝐼 .
Figure 4: Image filter results on an attack image.
original image 𝑂), 𝐹 will remain similar to 𝐼 ; otherwise, 𝐹 would
be significantly different from 𝐼 . For this purpose, we specifically
select the minimum filter because it could effectively remove the
original image pixels in the case of attack images.
The minimum filter is used with fixed window size. Figure 4
illustrates how the minimum filter works on an image. The image
filtering process is done by dividing the image𝑀 × 𝑁 into smaller
2D blocks 𝑥𝑏𝑖=1 × 𝑦𝑏𝑗=1 where 𝑏 is the number of blocks and 𝑥,𝑦 are
the filter size. If we use the 2 × 2 minimum filter, only the smallest
pixel value among a neighborhood of the block 𝑥𝑖 × 𝑦 𝑗 is selected
as shown in Figure 5. For applying the minimum filter, the smallest
pixel value from each block is selected.
We will discuss how to measure the image similarity between 𝐼
and 𝐹 and determine whether a given image is an attack image in
Section 4.
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Figure 5: Process of applying the minimum filter.
3.3 Method 3: Steganalysis Detection
The image-scaling attack’s key idea is to embed the target image
as cluttered pixels so that they are less recognized by human eye
perceptuality. Consequently, we treat the perturbed pixels as in-
formation that the attacker tries to hide in this method, which is
similar to steganography [22]. Steganography is a technique of
hiding information in digital media such as images to avoid secret
data detection by unintended recipients. Therefore, we may con-
structively employ steganalysis mechanisms to expose the hidden
perturbed pixels embedded by the image-scaling attack based on
the similarity between the image-scaling attack and steganography.
We explore the frequency domain based steganalysis mechanism
to find out the perturbed pixels within the attack image. Fourier
Transform (FT) is an operation that transforms data from the time
(or spatial) domain into the frequency domain [25]. Because an im-
age consists of discrete pixels rather than continuous patterns, we
use the Discrete Fourier Transformation (DFT) [3]. We first trans-
form the input (potential attack) image 𝐴 into the 2-dimensional
space, namely spectrum image. For a square image of size 𝑁 × 𝑁 ,
the 2-dimensional DFT is given by:
𝐹 (𝑘, 𝑙) =
𝑁−1∑︁
𝑖=0
𝑁−1∑︁
𝑗=0
𝑓 (𝑖, 𝑗))𝑒−𝑖2𝜋 ( 𝑘𝑖𝑁 + 𝑙𝑖𝑁 ) (2)
where 𝑓 (𝑖, 𝑗) is the spatial domain images, and the exponential
term is the corresponding basis function to each 𝐹 (𝑘, 𝑙) point in
the DFT space. The basis functions are sine and cosine waves with
increasing frequencies as depicted below:[
𝑐𝑜𝑠
(
2𝜋 (𝑘𝑖
𝑁
+ 𝑙𝑖
𝑁
)
)
− 𝑖 · 𝑠𝑖𝑛
(
2𝜋 (𝑘𝑖
𝑁
+ 𝑙𝑖
𝑁
)
)]
(3)
The resultant DFT spectrum contains the low and high-frequency
coefficients. The low frequencies capture the image’s core features,
whereas the high frequency reflects the less significant regions
within an image. Direct visualization of both frequencies shows
that a broad dark region in themiddle represents the high frequency,
while low frequency appears as a whiter clattered area on the edges.
This visualization can not provide us with an automated quantifi-
cation to distinguish attack images from benign images. Therefore,
we apply logarithmic with a shift to flip the whiter frequency to
centralize the low frequencies called centered spectrum as given
by:
𝐹 (𝑥,𝑦) =
𝑁−1∑︁
𝑘=0
𝑁−1∑︁
𝑙=0
log |Θ · 𝐹 (𝑘, 𝑙) | (4)
where Θ is the predetermined shift for 𝐹 (𝑘, 𝑙) low-frequency
point.
If we apply the FT operation on a benign image, a benign image
has one centered spectrum point. However, as shown in Figure 6,
attack images overall exhibit multiple centered spectra as oppo-
site to one centered spectrum point observed in benign images
because the cohesion of the original image pixels is broken due to
the arbitrary perturbation to embed the target image pixels.
Based on this observation, we suggest an image-scaling attack
detection method using the frequency domain based steganalysis.
Given an input image 𝐼 (which can potentially be an attack image)
for a CNN model, we convert it into a Fourier spectrum to obtain
the image 𝐵 and count the centered spectrum points in 𝐵. We will
discuss how to count the number of the centered spectrum points
and determine whether a given image is an attack image in Section
4.
Figure 6: Results of centered spectrum points on a benign
image and an attack image.
Summary: As an answer to RQ. 1, we suggest that three detection
methods (scaling, filtering, and steganalysis) can potentially expose
attack images generated by image-scaling attacks. Each method is
designed based on a different insight/angle to detect image-scaling
attacks. The scaling detection and filtering detection methods are
designed to detect the image-scaling attacks in the spatial domain,
while the steganalysis method is designed to detect the image-
scaling attacks in the frequency domain.
4 DECAMOUFLAGE SYSTEM DESIGN
In this section, we provide the Decamouflage framework exploiting
the above-identified detection methods to answer the RQ. 2:
RQ. 2: How can we develop an automated process to detect
image-scaling attacks using the identified methods?
We first define the threat models that we focused on in this
paper. Next, we introduce three key metrics to find image-scaling
attacks in an automated manner. We finally provide an overview of
the Decamouflage detection system that can efficiently distinguish
attack images from benign images with the methods identified in
Section 3.
4.1 Threat Model
For a defense mechanism, we consider both white-box and black-
box settings. In the white-box setting, we assume that the defender
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(i.e., service provider) knows the attacker’s algorithm; thus, the
parameters for Decamouflage are determined to target for the at-
tacker’s specific algorithm. In the black-box setting, we assume
that the defender does not know the attacker’s algorithm. Perhaps,
the black-box setting seems more practical because it would be
difficult to obtain information about the attacker’s algorithm, and
we should also consider many different conditions for the image-
scaling attack.
Decamouflage can be performed offline and online. Offline is
suitable for defeating backdoor attack assisted with image-scaling
attack (presented in Section 2.2). Herein, the defender is the data
aggregator/user who has access to attack images. In this case, we
reasonably assume that the user owns a small set, e.g., 1000 of hold-
out samples produced in-house. The defender must remove attack
images crafted by image-scaling attacks to avoid backdoor inser-
tion in the trained model. On the other hand, for online detection,
Decamouflage is to tell whether input images are attack images or
benign images during run-time.
4.2 Metrics for Decamouflage
Decamouflage is basically built as an ensemble solution on the three
image-scaling attack detection approaches presented in Section 3.
Therefore, it is essential to quantify the differences between attack
images and benign images for each approach.
Here, we recommend using MSE and SSIM [9] for scaling detec-
tion 3.1 and filtering detection 3.2 methods. We considered several
metrics such as peak signal-to-noise ratio (PSNR) (see Appendix A)
but we found that MSE and SSIM are most suitable for Decamou-
flage. As for the steganalysis detection method 3.3, we recommend
using the number of centered spectrum points. The definition of
each metric is as follows:
• MSE computes the average of the squares of the differences
between two images 𝐴 and 𝐵 as given in Equation.5, where
𝑦𝑖 is the 𝑖th pixel in the image 𝐴; 𝑦𝑖 is the 𝑗th pixel in the
image 𝐵; and 𝑛 is the size of 𝐴3.
𝑀𝑆𝐸 =
1
𝑛
𝑛∑︁
𝑖=1
(𝑦1 − 𝑦𝑖 )2 (5)
• SSIM index is another popularly used metric to compute
the similarities of local luminance, contrast, and structure
between two images due to its excellent performance and
simple calculation. The SSIM index can be calculated in win-
dows with different sizes (block unit or image unit) for two
images. The SSIM index between two images 𝐴 and 𝐵 can
be calculated as follows:
𝑆𝑆𝐼𝑀 (𝐴, 𝐵) = (2𝜇𝐴𝜇𝐵 + 𝑐1) (2𝜎𝐴𝐵 + 𝑐2)(
𝜇2𝐴 + 𝜇2𝐵 + 𝑐1
) (
𝜎2𝐴 + 𝜎2𝐵 + 𝑐2
) (6)
where 𝜇𝐴𝜇𝐵 are the average of𝐴 and 𝐵; 𝜎2𝐴 +𝜎2𝐵 and 𝜎𝐴𝐵 are
their variance and covariance, respectively. Here, 𝑐1 and 𝑐2
are variables to stabilize the division with weak denominator.
3In Decamouflage, we use the same size of input images𝐴 and 𝐵.
• CSP is the number of centered spectrum points on an image
in the frequency domain space. To count this number from a
given image, we first apply the FT operation and then apply
a low pass filter to allow only low frequencies. Given a radius
value 𝐷𝑇 as a threshold, our low pass filter can be modeled
as follows:
𝐻 (𝑢, 𝑣) =
{
1 𝑖 𝑓 𝐷 (𝑢, 𝑣) ≤ 𝐷𝑇
0 𝑖 𝑓 𝐷 (𝑢, 𝑣) > 𝐷𝑇 (7)
Finally, after applying the low pass filter on the image, we
obtain a binary spectrum image containing low frequencies
only. The number of bright low-frequency points is then
automatically counted by using a contour detection function.
This process is visualized in Figure 7.
Figure 7: Process of computing the centered spectrumpoints
on an original image and an attack image. Given an image,
we first apply the FT operation and then apply a low pass
filter to extract the low frequencies of the image only (see
‘Binary spectrum’). Finally, we count the number of cen-
tered spectrum points using a contour detection algorithm.
In this example, we can see three centered spectrum points
in the attack image while there is only one centered spec-
trum point in the original image.
4.3 Overview of Decamouflage
The overview of Decamouflage is illustrated in Figure 8, whereas
each of the three methods is detailed in Algorithm 1,2 and 3, respec-
tively. Given an input image 𝐼 (which can potentially be an attack
image) for a CNN model, Decamouflage runs the three methods (de-
scribed in Algorithm 1, 2 and 3) yielding the decision individually in
parallel, and then performs majority voting (ensemble technique) to
determine whether 𝐼 is an attack image crafted by the image-scaling
attack or not.
Figure 8: Overview of Decamouflage.
Algorithm 1 describes the computational procedure of the scal-
ing detection method. In this algorithm, we initially set𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘 𝑓 𝑙𝑎𝑔
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to 𝐹𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 (line 3). We convert the input image 𝐼 into 𝐷 using a
downscaling operation and then convert 𝐷 into 𝑆 using an up-
scaling operation (lines 4–5). Next, we calculate either 𝑀𝑆𝐸 (𝐼 ,𝑆)
or 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝑀(𝐼 ,𝑆) between 𝐼 and 𝑆 depending on𝑀𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐 𝑓 𝑙𝑎𝑔 indicating
which metric is used (line 6–12). If the calculated metric value 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒
is greater than or equal to the predefined threshold 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑇 , we set
𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘 𝑓 𝑙𝑎𝑔 to 𝐹𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 (lines 13–15). Similarly, we design Algorithm
2 and 3, but we skip the details of those algorithms from this paper
due to the paper page limit.
To use each method effectively, we empirically set the thresh-
old value for the method. Our recommended threshold values are
presented in Section 5.1.
Algorithm 1 Scaling detection
1: procedure Scaling detection(𝐼 ,𝑀𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐 𝑓 𝑙𝑎𝑔)
2: ⊲ 𝐼 : input image,𝑀𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐 𝑓 𝑙𝑎𝑔: input metric flag
3: 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘 𝑓 𝑙𝑎𝑔 ← 𝐹𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒
4: 𝐷 ← 𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑒 𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛(𝐼 ) ⊲ 𝐷 : downscaled image
5: 𝑆 ← 𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑒 𝑢𝑝 (𝐷) ⊲ 𝑆 : upscaled image
6: if 𝑀𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐 𝑓 𝑙𝑎𝑔 == 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒 then
7: 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 ← 𝑀𝑆𝐸 (𝐼 ,𝑆)
8: 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑇 ← 𝑀𝑆𝐸𝑇 ⊲ 𝑀𝑆𝐸𝑇 : MSE Threshold
9: else
10: 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 ← 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝑀 (𝐼 ,𝑆)
11: 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑇 ← 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝑀𝑇 ⊲ 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝑀𝑇 : SSIM Threshold
12: end if
13: if 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 ≥ 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑇 then
14: 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘 𝑓 𝑙𝑎𝑔 ← 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒
15: end if
16: return 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘 𝑓 𝑙𝑎𝑔
17: end procedure
Algorithm 2 Filtering detection
1: procedure Filtering detection(𝐼 ,𝑀𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐 𝑓 𝑙𝑎𝑔)
2: ⊲ 𝐼 : input image,𝑀𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐 𝑓 𝑙𝑎𝑔: input metric flag
3: 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘 𝑓 𝑙𝑎𝑔 ← 𝐹𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒
4: 𝐹 ←𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚 𝑓 𝑖𝑙𝑡𝑒𝑟 (𝐼 ) ⊲ 𝐹 : filtered image
5: if 𝑀𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐 𝑓 𝑙𝑎𝑔 == 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒 then
6: 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 ← 𝑀𝑆𝐸 (𝐼 ,𝐹 )
7: 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑇 ← 𝑀𝑆𝐸𝑇 ⊲ 𝑀𝑆𝐸𝑇 : MSE Threshold
8: else
9: 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 ← 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝑀 (𝐼 ,𝐹 )
10: 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑇 ← 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝑀𝑇 ⊲ 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝑀𝑇 : SSIM Threshold
11: end if
12: if 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 ≥ 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑇 then
13: 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘 𝑓 𝑙𝑎𝑔 ← 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒
14: end if
15: return 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘 𝑓 𝑙𝑎𝑔
16: end procedure
Summary: As an answer to RQ. 2, we present Decamouflage to
detect image-scaling attacks in an automated manner. To achieve
this goal, we suggest three metrics (MSE, SSIM, and CSP) that can
be effectively used for the three techniques in Section 3.
Algorithm 3 Steganalysis detection
1: procedure Steganalysis detection(𝐼 ) ⊲ 𝐼 : input image
2: 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘 𝑓 𝑙𝑎𝑔 ← 𝐹𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒
3: 𝐶 ← 𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑚 𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑒 (𝐼 )
4: ⊲ 𝐶: centered spectrum image
5: 𝐵 ← 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡 𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑦 (𝐶) ⊲ 𝐵: binary image
6: 𝐶𝑆𝑃𝐵 ← 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑚 𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝐵
7: ⊲ 𝐶𝑆𝑃𝐵 : the number of centered spectrum points in 𝐵
8: if 𝐶𝑆𝑃𝐵 ≥ 𝐶𝑆𝑃𝑇 then ⊲ 𝐶𝑆𝑃𝑇 : CSP threshold
9: 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘 𝑓 𝑙𝑎𝑔 ← 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒
10: end if
11: return 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘 𝑓 𝑙𝑎𝑔
12: end procedure
5 EVALUATION
This section introduces the experiment setup and performance
evaluation for Decamouflage.
5.1 Experiment Setup
For a more practical testing environment, we consider evaluat-
ing the performance of Decamouflage for an unseen dataset. We
used “NeurIPS 2017 Adversarial Attacks and Defences Competition
Track” [12] to select the optimal threshold values and “Caltech
256 image dataset” [17] to evaluate the performance of Decamou-
flage with the selected threshold values in detecting image-scaling
attacks.
We first evaluate the Decamouflage detection performance under
the white-box setting to validate the feasibility and then under
the black-box setting to demonstrate its practicality. The main
challenging question we explore in evaluation is as follows:
RQ. 3: How can we determine an appropriate threshold in
white-box or black-box settings?
White-box setting (Feasibility study): Following the identified
threat model, as presented in Section 4.1, we assume in the white-
box setting that we have full access to the attacker’s mechanism to
mainly demonstrate the feasibility of a detection method. In this
setting, we follow the steps shown in Figure 9. In the first stage,
we randomly select 1000 original images and 1000 target images
from the “NeurIPS 2017 Adversarial Attacks and Defences Compe-
tition Track” image dataset [12] and generate 1000 attack images
by combining original images and target images, respectively; and
we select the optimal thresholds with those images (we call them
training dataset). Next, in the second stage, we randomly select
1000 original images and 1000 target images from the “Caltech
256 image dataset” [17] and evaluate the detection performance of
the detection method with those images (we call them evaluation
dataset).
To select the optimal threshold value for the scaling detection
method presented in Section 3.1, we calculate𝑀𝑆𝐸 (𝑜,𝑆) ,𝑀𝑆𝐸 (𝑎,𝑆) ,
𝑆𝑆𝐼𝑀 (𝑜,𝑆) , and 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝑀 (𝑎,𝑆) for all 𝑜 ∈ 𝑂 and for all 𝑎 ∈ 𝐴. Here,
our goal is to show that we can select threshold values to dis-
tinguish 𝑀𝑆𝐸 (𝑜,𝑆) and 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝑀 (𝑜,𝑆) from 𝑀𝑆𝐸 (𝑎,𝑆) and 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝑀 (𝑎,𝑆) ,
respectively.
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Figure 9: White-box setting to validate the feasibility of De-
camouflage. (a) Threshold selection, and (b) evaluation.
Similarly, to select the optimal threshold value for the filtering
detection method presented in Section 3.2, we calculate𝑀𝑆𝐸 (𝑜,𝐹 ) ,
𝑀𝑆𝐸 (𝑎,𝐹 ) , 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝑀 (𝑜,𝐹 ) , and 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝑀 (𝑎,𝐹 ) for all 𝑜 ∈ 𝑂 and for all 𝑎 ∈ 𝐴.
Again, to select the optimal threshold value for the filtering
detection method presented in Section 3.3, we calculate 𝐶𝑆𝑃𝑜 and
𝐶𝑆𝑃𝑎 for all 𝑜 ∈ 𝑂 and for all 𝑎 ∈ 𝐴. In the following sections,
we show that there exists a clear recommended threshold value
for each method, and the threshold value can be determined in an
automated manner with a training dataset only.
Selecting the optimal threshold for a detectionmethod in
the white-box setting: To determine the threshold of a metric𝑀
for a detection method in the white-box setting, we developed a
gradient descent method that searches for the optimal threshold.
The proposed gradient descent method computes the metric values
for original images (𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 ) and attack images (𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘 ), respec-
tively, in the training dataset. Next, the gradient descent method
picks a metric value from 𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 and 𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘 , respectively, af-
ter ascendingly grading them and determines the threshold as the
middle point between them to assess the detection accuracy. This
process is repeated until the highest detection accuracy is achieved.
As an example, Figure 10 shows the selected threshold result for
the scaling detection method. For all detection methods presented
in Section 3, we selected the best thresholds using this gradient
descent method.
Figure 10: Threshold selection results for the scaling detec-
tionmethod in thewhite-box setting. The best threshold val-
ues are represented by the red dash lines.
Black-box setting (Practicality study): The black-box setting
evaluates the practicality of a detection method with no assumed
knowledge of the attacking mechanism. In this scenario, we need
to determine the threshold with benign images alone because there
is no access to attack images. The black-box setting also follows
two stages shown in Figure 11. In the first stage, we compute the
metric values (i.e., MSE, SSIM, and CSP) with benign images in
the training dataset and analyze their statistical distributions to
determine the metrics’ thresholds. In the second stage, we use the
detection methods with the selected thresholds to evaluate the
performance of the detection method with the evaluation dataset.
Figure 11: Black-box setting to analyze the practicality of De-
camouflage. (a) Threshold selection, and (b) evaluation.
Selecting the optimal threshold for the black-box setting:
To determine the threshold of a metric𝑀 for a detection method in
the black-box setting, we compute the metric values for original
images (𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 ) to use the statistical distribution of 𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 ,
such as its mean and standard deviation. We adopt a percentile of
that distribution as a detection boundary and use it as a threshold.
Percentile is a measure used in statistics indicating the value beyond
a given distribution. With the training dataset, we select the optimal
percentile of the metrics results from their distributions as the
threshold achieving the best accuracy results for the detection
method.
The detection accuracy of Decamouflage is evaluated with five
metrics, accuracy, precision, recall, false acceptance rate (FAR), and
false rejection rate (FRR), which are popularly used to evaluate the
performance of classifiers.
• FAR is the percentage of attack images that are classified as
benign images by a detection method.
• FRR is the percentage of benign images that are classified
as attack images by a detection method.
• Accuracy (Acc.) is the percentage of correctly classified im-
ages by a detection method.
• Precision (Pre.) is the percentage of images classified as
attack images by a detection method, which are actual attack
images.
• Recall (Rec.) is the percentage of attack images that were
accurately classified by a detection method.
In general, while FRR is an indication of detection systems’ reli-
ability, FAR shows the security performance. Ideally, both FRR and
FAR should be 0%. Often, a detection system tries to minimize its
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FAR while maintaining an acceptable FRR as a trade-off, especially
under security-critical applications.
5.2 Results of the Scaling Detection Method
Results in thewhite-box setting: Figure 12 demonstrates that we
can find a reasonable threshold (red dashed lines) in both MSE and
SSIM to distinguish original images from attack images. We use the
gradient descent method to find such thresholds in an automated
manner. The selected threshold value for MSE is 1714.96; and the
selected threshold value for SSIM is 0.61.
Figure 12: Distributions of MSE and SSIM values for the scal-
ing detection method in the white-box setting with 1000
original images and 1000 attack images.
With the selected threshold values, we evaluate the scaling de-
tection method’s performance (accuracy, precision, recall, FAR, and
FRR) for the evaluation dataset. Table 2 shows that the detection
accuracy results of the scaling detection method in the white-box
setting. The scaling detection method achieves an accuracy of 99.9%
with FAR of 0.0% and FRR of 0.1% for MSE.
Table 2: Results of the scaling detectionmethod in thewhite-
box setting.
𝐴𝑐𝑐. 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐. 𝑅𝑒𝑐. 𝐹𝐴𝑅 𝐹𝑅𝑅
𝑀𝑆𝐸 99.9% 100% 99.9% 0.0% 0.1%
𝑆𝑆𝐼𝑀 99.0% 99.7% 99.9% 0.3% 0.1%
Results in the black-box setting:We adopt the percentile of
the obtained MSE and SSIM distributions built upon 1000 benign
images to validate the black-box scenario performance. Figure 13
demonstrates that MSE values and the SSIM values follow a nor-
mal distribution, respectively, indicating that a percentile-based
threshold performs well. As percentile increases, FRR also increases.
With the three different percentiles (1%, 2%, and 3%), we evaluate
the scaling detection method’s performance (accuracy, precision,
recall, FAR, and FRR) for the evaluation dataset, respectively. Ta-
ble 3 shows the detection accuracy results of the scaling detection
method with the three different percentiles in the black-box setting.
Based on the accuracy results, our recommendation is to use either
MSE or SSIM with 1% percentile. The scaling detection method
achieves an accuracy of 99.5% with FAR of 0.0% and FRR of 1.0%
for MSE. Similarly, when the percentile is 1%, the scaling detection
Figure 13: Distributions of MSE and SSIM values for the scal-
ing detectionmethod in the black-box settingwith 1000 orig-
inal images. A percentile is represented as a green segment.
method produces the best accuracy of 99.5% with FAR of 0.0% and
FRR of 1.0% for SSIM, which are comparable to the results in the
white-box setting.
Table 3: Results of the scaling detectionmethod in the black-
box setting.
Percentile 𝐴𝑐𝑐. 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐. 𝑅𝑒𝑐. 𝐹𝐴𝑅 𝐹𝑅𝑅 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝑆𝑇𝐷
𝑀𝑆𝐸
1% 99.5% 100.0% 99.0% 0.0% 1.0%
2% 99.0% 100.0% 98.0% 0.0% 2.0% 218.6 217.6
3% 98.5% 100.0% 97.1% 0.0% 3.0%
𝑆𝑆𝐼𝑀
1% 99.5% 100.0% 99.0% 0.0% 1.0%
2% 99.0% 100.0% 98.0% 0.0% 2.0% 0.91 0.59
3% 98.5% 100.0% 97.0% 0.0% 3.0%
5.3 Results of the Filtering Detection Method
Results in the white-box setting: Figure 14 demonstrates that
we can find a reasonable threshold (red dashed lines) in both MSE
and SSIM to distinguish original images from attack images even
though there exist some overlapped part between them in MSE.
Again, we use the gradient descent method to find such thresholds
in an automated manner. The selected threshold value for MSE is
5682.79; and the selected threshold value for SSIM is 0.38.
Figure 14: Distributions of MSE and SSIM values for the fil-
tering detection method in the white-box setting with 1000
original images and 1000 attack images.
With the selected threshold values, we evaluate the filtering
detection method’s performance (accuracy, precision, recall, FAR,
and FRR) for the evaluation dataset. Table 4 shows that the detection
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accuracy results of the filtering detection method in the white-box
setting. The filtering detection method achieves an accuracy of
99.3% with FAR of 1.3% and FRR of 0.2% for SSIM.
Table 4: Results of the filtering detection method in the
white-box setting.
𝐴𝑐𝑐. 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐. 𝑅𝑒𝑐. 𝐹𝐴𝑅 𝐹𝑅𝑅
𝑀𝑆𝐸 98.6% 97.5% 99.2% 2.5% 0.8%
𝑆𝑆𝐼𝑀 99.3% 98.7% 99.7% 1.3% 0.2%
Results in the black-box setting:We adopt the percentile of
the obtained MSE and SSIM distributions built upon 1000 benign
images to validate the black-box scenario performance. Figure 15
demonstrates that MSE values and the SSIM values follow a nor-
mal distribution, respectively, indicating that a percentile-based
threshold performs well.
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Figure 15: Distributions of MSE and SSIM values for the fil-
tering detection method in the black-box setting with 1000
original images. A percentile is represented as a green seg-
ment.
With the three different percentiles (1%, 2%, and 3%), we evaluate
the filtering detection method’s performance (accuracy, precision,
recall, FAR, and FRR) for the evaluation dataset, respectively. Ta-
ble 5 shows the detection accuracy results of the filtering detection
method with the three different percentiles in the black-box set-
ting. Based on the accuracy results, our recommendation is to use
SSIM with 1% percentile. In this case, the filtering detection method
achieves an accuracy of 99.2% with FAR of 0.6% and FRR of 1.0% for
SSIM.
Table 5: Results of the filtering detection method in black-
box setting.
Percentile 𝐴𝑐𝑐. 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐. 𝑅𝑒𝑐. 𝐹𝐴𝑅 𝐹𝑅𝑅 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝑆𝑇𝐷
𝑀𝑆𝐸
1% 98.4% 97.8% 98.9% 2.2% 1.0%
2% 98.5% 99.0% 98.1% 0.9% 2.0% 1952.32 1543.27
3% 98.2% 99.4% 97.1% 0.5% 3.0%
𝑆𝑆𝐼𝑀
1% 99.2% 99.3% 98.9% 0.6% 1.0%
2% 98.7% 99.4% 98.0% 0.5% 2.0% 0.74 0.11
3% 98.2% 99.4% 96.9% 0.5% 3.0%
5.4 Results of the Steganalysis Detection
Method
Results in the white-box setting: Figure 16 shows that 99.3% of
original images have 1 CSP, whereas 98.2% of attack images have
more than 1 CSP, indicating that we can clearly distinguish them if
we set the CSP threshold to 2.
Figure 16: Distributions of CSP values for the steganalysis
detection method in the white-box setting with 1000 origi-
nal images and 1000 attack images.
With the CSP threshold of 2, we evaluate the steganalysis detec-
tion method’s performance (accuracy, precision, recall, FAR, and
FRR) for the evaluation dataset. Table 6 shows that the detection ac-
curacy results of the steganalysis detection method in the white-box
setting. The steganalysis detection method achieves an accuracy of
98.9% with FAR of 0.3% and FRR of 1.7%.
Table 6: Results of the steganalysis detection method in the
white-box setting.
𝐴𝑐𝑐. 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐. 𝑅𝑒𝑐. 𝐹𝐴𝑅 𝐹𝑅𝑅
𝐶𝑆𝑃 98.9% 99.7% 98.2% 0.3% 1.7%
Results in the black-box setting: Interestingly, we do not
need to analyze the CSP distribution of original images in the
steganalysis detection method, unlike the other detection methods.
Based on our observation of the white-box setting experiments, we
surmise that the attack images generated by image-scaling attacks
inherently have multiple centered spectrum points. Therefore, we
use a fixed threshold of 2 for CSP in the steganalysis detection
method regardless of original and attack images. Consequently, we
can reduce the cost of determining thresholds in the steganalysis
detection method. If we use 2 for the CSP threshold, the steganalysis
detection method achieves an accuracy of 98.9% with FAR of 0.3%
and FRR of 1.7%, which are the same as the results in the white-box
setting.
5.5 Run-time Overhead and Ensemble
Approach
Run-time overhead:As the threshold determination is performed
offline, we focus on the most concerning overhead — run-time
overhead in a real-time situation. In other words, how long the
plug-in Decamouflage system takes from getting an input image
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until producing the detection decision.We implementDecamouflage
in Python 3. We use a PC with an Intel Core i5-7500 CPU (3.41GHz)
and 8GBmemory in all our experiments. Table 7 details the run-time
overhead of Decamouflage system. The decision requires between
3 and 174 millisecond/image on average.
Furthermore, each method’s standard deviation is small, indicat-
ing that it takes a similar time regardless of images. Those measure-
ment results demonstrate that Decamouflage can be deployed for
real-time detection. Notably, the steganalysis detection method can
be deployed to detect image-scaling attacks efficiently without the
threshold setup process.
Table 7: Run-time overheads of detection methods
Method Matrix
Run-time
overhead
(millisecond)
Standard
deviation
(millisecond)
𝑆𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔
MSE 11 5
SSIM 137 4
𝐹𝑖𝑙𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔
MSE 11 3
SSIM 174 6
𝑆𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑖𝑠 CSP 3 1
Ensemble approach: We showed that each of the three de-
tection methods in Section 3 produced a high detection accuracy
against image-scaling attacks. In this paragraph, we discuss the
possibility of an ensemble approach of those methods to improve
the reliability and detection accuracy. We can develop a simple en-
semble model based on a majority voting rule of multiple detection
methods. Its advantages are that (1) it achieves better and stable
results, and (2) it hardens adaptive attacks that could be effective
against a particular detection method. Table 8 shows the detailed
experimental results, where the performance of both the white-box
and black-box ensemble models are evaluated.
Table 8: Result of Decamouflage system as an ensemble
model. The black-box and white-box settings both demon-
strate promising results.
𝐴𝑐𝑐. 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐. 𝑅𝑒𝑐. 𝐹𝐴𝑅 𝐹𝑅𝑅
White-box ensemble 99.9% 99.8% 100.0% 0.2% 0.0%
Black-box ensemble 99.8% 99.8% 99.9% 0.2% 0.1%
In the white-box setting, Decamouflage achieves an accuracy of
99.9% with FAR of 0.2% and FRR of 0.0%, indicating that it does not
classify any original images mistakenly into attack images with a
minimal false acceptance. Moreover, even in the black-box setting,
Decamouflage can produce highly accurate outputs achieving an
accuracy of 99.8% with FAR of 0.2% and FRR of 0.1%, which slightly
outperforms the best configuration of each detection method.
Summary: As an answer to RQ. 3, we present how to determine
an appropriate threshold in the white-box and black-box settings.
In the white-box setting, we specially develop a gradient descent
method that searches for each metric’s optimal threshold across
the dataset of benign and attack images and uses that threshold
against an unseen dataset. In the black-box setting, we adopt the
percentile as a detection boundary after analyzing the statistical
distribution of original images in a metric.
6 DISCUSSIONS
Considerations for adaptive attacks:Decamouflage is built upon
the three detection methods: scaling, filtering, and steganalysis. In
fact, our experimental results demonstrate that each of the three
methods is sufficiently accurate to detect image-scaling attacks and
thus can be individually opted for deployment. However, those
detection methods can be incorporated together to work in an en-
semble manner to harden the adaptive attacks: an attacker now has
to bypass them concurrently. Quiring et al. [20] demonstrated that
by developing an adaptive attack to Xiao et al.’s [27] initial mitiga-
tion strategy of using an image histogram. Considering this kind of
possibility of adaptive attacks, Decamouflage has been developed
for defense-in-depth of the image-scaling attack detection system.
Robustness of image similarity metrics: To quantify the differ-
ence between the input image and its rescaled or filtered counter-
part, we suggested two metrics: MSE and SSIM (see Section 4.2).
We believe that MSE-based detection methods’ performance could
deteriorate with highly distorted images because MSE relies on
measuring the absolute errors, whereas SSIM-based detection can
take luminance, contrast, and structure of images into considera-
tion [23]. After all, it would be more robust against such distorted
images. Interestingly, unlike MSE and SSIM, we observed that PSNR
could be ineffective in showing a threshold to distinguish benign
images from attack images even though PSNR is also popularly
used to calculate the physical difference between the two images
(see Appendix A). We surmise that this is due to peak errors that
can significantly affect PSNR values. On the other hand, MSE relies
on the cumulative squared errors that soften the difference between
the benign and its rescaled or filtered counterpart into lower level,
which can reduce the effects of peak errors.
Characteristics of the attack images that cannot be detected
by Decamouflage:We analyze the attack images that are falsely
accepted as benign images by Decamouflage. Table 9 and Appen-
dix B show a few representative examples of such attack images.
Therefore, attackers can try to generate such attack images using ad-
versarial machine learning techniques for bypassing Decamouflage
intentionally. However, we found that it would be very challenging
to generate attack images that cannot be detected by Decamouflage
and are still effective. We analyzed the attack images that Decamou-
flage failed to detect with commercial cloud-based computer vision
services that deploy the state-of-the-art machine learning models
including Microsoft Azure4, Baidu5, and Tencent6. We observed
that most of such attack images were not recognized as attackers’
target images. For example, as presented in Table 9, both attack
images were not classified as the target images by all the tested
three computer vision services —losing their attacking purpose.
4https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/services/cognitive-services/computer-
vision/?v=18.05
5https://ai.baidu.com/tech/imagerecognition/fine_grained
6https://ai.qq.com/product/visionimgidy.shtml
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Table 9: Example attack images that are mistakenly accepted by Decamouflage. Those images have been misclassified as dif-
ferent objects by three computer vision classifiers (Azure, Baidu, and Tencent), indicating that while those attack images may
pass the system, they might lose the attacker’s original purpose.
Original vsAttack Original vsAttack
Image
Azure 42.3% 47.2% 99.4% 68.6% text, 66.1% glass,
A fish swimunderwater A blue background Aflower 61.8% soft drink
Baidu 99.8% 99.3% 62.2% Subject not detected
Killerwhale Non-animal Hibiscus
Tencent 25% animal, 53%water, 18% night,18% screenshot 65% flower, 25% branches 12% night, 14% cave, 16%
35%fish and leaves rock, 15%water, 14% light
7 RELATEDWORK
Several techniques have been proposed in the literature to violate
the security of neural network models, as detailed in [2, 16]. In
recent years, many new attack and defense techniques [1, 4, 13, 14,
19] have been developed in the area of adversarial machine learning
field. Unlike the image-scaling attack introduced by Xiao et al. [27],
adversarial examples are neural network dependent. In the white-
box setting, they are specifically designed based on the knowledge
about the model parameters such as weights and inputs to trick
a model into making an erroneous prediction. In the black-box
setting, the adversary still needs to look at themodel output inmany
iterations to generate an adversarial sample. In contrast, the image-
scaling attack is agnostic to feature extraction and learning models
because it targets the early preprocessing pipeline — rescaling
operation. The image-scaling attack also greatly facilitates data
poisoning attacks to insert a backdoor into the CNN model [6].
Quiring et al. [20] explored this possibility explicitly.
As far as we know, defense mechanisms against image scaling at-
tacks were only investigated by Quiring et al. [18]. They suggested
two prevention mechanisms to prohibit the scaling function from
injecting the desired attack image. However, their suggested tech-
niques have a few limitations, as mentioned in Section 1, such as
incompatibility with existing scaling algorithms and side-effects of
degrading the input image quality using the image reconstruction
method. In this paper, we propose a novel image-scaling attack
detection framework called Decamouflage to overcome these limi-
tations.
8 CONCLUSION
We present Decamouflage to detect image-scaling attacks, which
can affect many computer vision applications using image-scaling
functions. We explored the three promising detection methods: scal-
ing, filtering, and steganalysis, which can be individually deployed
or incorporated together as an ensemble solution. We performed ex-
tensive evaluations with two independent datasets, demonstrating
the effectiveness of Decamouflage (see more examples in Appen-
dix C, D, and E). For each detection method of Decamouflage, we
suggest the best metric and thresholds maximizing the detection
accuracy. In particular, the steganalysis detection method can be
efficiently used with a fixed threshold for CSP regardless of datasets.
Our detection solutions can be robust and effective as an ensemble
solution with those detection methods. In the white-box setting (for
the feasibility study), Decamouflage achieves an accuracy of 99.9%
with FAR of 0.2%, and FRR of 0.0%. Even in the black-box setting
(for the practicality study), Decamouflage achieves an accuracy of
99.8% with FAR of 0.2%, and FAR of 0.1%. Moreover, the run-time
overhead evaluation shows that the Decamouflage is also acceptable
to be deployed for real-time online detection.
REFERENCES
[1] Battista Biggio, Igino Corona, Davide Maiorca, Blaine Nelson, Nedim Šrndić,
Pavel Laskov, Giorgio Giacinto, and Fabio Roli. 2013. Evasion attacks against
machine learning at test time. In Proceeding of the 13th Joint European Conference
on Machine Learning and Knowledge Discovery in Databases. 387–402.
[2] Battista Biggio and Fabio Roli. 2018. Wild patterns: Ten years after the rise of
adversarial machine learning. Pattern Recognition 84 (2018), 317–331.
[3] Ronald Newbold Bracewell and Ronald N Bracewell. 1986. The Fourier Transform
and Its Applications. Vol. 31999.
[4] Nicholas Carlini and David Wagner. 2017. Towards evaluating the robustness
of neural networks. In Proceedings of the 38th IEEE Symposium on Security and
Privacy. 39–57.
[5] Karan Ganju, Qi Wang, Wei Yang, Carl A Gunter, and Nikita Borisov. 2018.
Property inference attacks on fully connected neural networks using permutation
invariant representations. In Proceedings of the 25th ACM Conference on Computer
and Communications Security. 619–633.
[6] Yansong Gao, Bao Gia Doan, Zhi Zhang, Siqi Ma, Anmin Fu, Surya Nepal, and
Hyoungshick Kim. 2020. Backdoor Attacks and Countermeasures on Deep
Learning: A Comprehensive Review. arXiv preprint arXiv:2007.10760 (2020).
[7] Tianyu Gu, Brendan Dolan-Gavitt, and Siddharth Garg. 2017. Badnets: Identifying
vulnerabilities in the machine learning model supply chain. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1708.06733 (2017).
[8] Kaiming He, Xiangyu Zhang, Shaoqing Ren, and Jian Sun. 2016. Deep residual
learning for image recognition. In Proceedings of the 29th IEEE Conference on
Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition. 770–778.
[9] Alain Hore and Djemel Ziou. 2010. Image quality metrics: PSNR vs. SSIM. In
Proceedings of the 20th International Conference on Pattern Recognition. 2366–2369.
[10] Gao Huang, Zhuang Liu, Laurens Van Der Maaten, and Kilian Q Weinberger.
2017. Densely connected convolutional networks. In Proceedings of the 30th IEEE
Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition. 4700–4708.
[11] Alex Krizhevsky, Ilya Sutskever, and Geoffrey E Hinton. 2012. Imagenet clas-
sification with deep convolutional neural networks. In Proceedings of the 26th
Annual Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems. 1097–1105.
[12] Alexey Kurakin, Ian Goodfellow, Samy Bengio, Yinpeng Dong, Fangzhou Liao,
Ming Liang, Tianyu Pang, Jun Zhu, Xiaolin Hu, Cihang Xie, Jianyu Wang,
Zhishuai Zhang, Zhou Ren, Alan Yuille, Sangxia Haung, Yao Zhao, Yuzhe Zhao,
Zhonglin Han, Junjiajia Long, Yerkebulan Berdibekov, Takuya Akiba, Seiya Tokui,
and Motoki Abe. 2018. Adversarial attacks and defences competition. In The
NIPS’17 Competition: Building Intelligent Systems. 195–231.
[13] Mathias Lecuyer, Vaggelis Atlidakis, Roxana Geambasu, Daniel Hsu, and Suman
Jana. 2019. Certified robustness to adversarial examples with differential privacy.
In Proceedings of the 40th IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. 656–672.
[14] Jinfeng Li, Shouling Ji, Tianyu Du, Bo Li, and Ting Wang. 2018. Textbug-
ger: Generating adversarial text against real-world applications. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1812.05271 (2018).
Decamouflage: A Framework to Detect Image-Scaling Attacks on Convolutional Neural Networks Conference’17, July 2017, Washington, DC, USA
[15] Yingqi Liu, Shiqing Ma, Yousra Aafer, Wen-Chuan Lee, Juan Zhai, WeihangWang,
and Xiangyu Zhang. 2017. Trojaning attack on neural networks. (2017).
[16] Nicolas Papernot, Patrick McDaniel, Arunesh Sinha, and Michael P Wellman.
2018. SoK: Security and privacy in machine learning. In Proceedings of the 3rd
IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy. 399–414.
[17] Pietro Perona. 2019. Caltech-256 Object Category Dataset. Technical Report.
http://www.vision.caltech.edu/Image_Datasets/Caltech256/ Accessed on: 2019-
10-02.
[18] Erwin Quiring, David Klein, Daniel Arp, Martin Johns, and Konrad Rieck. 2020.
Adversarial Preprocessing: Understanding and Preventing Image-Scaling Attacks
in Machine Learning. In Proceedings of the 29th USENIX Security Symposium.
1–18.
[19] Erwin Quiring, Alwin Maier, and Konrad Rieck. 2019. Misleading authorship
attribution of source code using adversarial learning. In Proceedings of the 28th
USENIX Security Symposium. 479–496.
[20] Erwin Quiring and Konrad Rieck. 2020. Backdooring and Poisoning Neural
Networks with Image-Scaling Attacks. arXiv preprint arXiv:2003.08633 (2020).
[21] Robert J Schalkoff. 1989. Digital Image Processing and Computer Vision. Vol. 286.
Wiley New York.
[22] Frank Y Shih. 2017. Digital watermarking and steganography: fundamentals and
techniques. CRC press.
[23] Eric A Silva, Karen Panetta, and Sos S Agaian. 2007. Quantifying image similarity
usingmeasure of enhancement by entropy. InMobile Multimedia/Image Processing
for Military and Security Applications 2007, Vol. 6579. International Society for
Optics and Photonics, 1–12.
[24] Christian Szegedy,Wojciech Zaremba, Ilya Sutskever, Joan Bruna, Dumitru Erhan,
Ian Goodfellow, and Rob Fergus. 2013. Intriguing properties of neural networks.
arXiv preprint arXiv:1312.6199 (2013).
[25] Wim Van Drongelen. 2018. Signal processing for neuroscientists. Academic Press.
[26] Yandong Wen, Kaipeng Zhang, Zhifeng Li, and Yu Qiao. 2016. A discriminative
feature learning approach for deep face recognition. In Proceedings of the 12th
European Conference on Computer Vision. 499–515.
[27] Qixue Xiao, Yufei Chen, Chao Shen, Yu Chen, and Kang Li. 2019. Seeing is not
believing: camouflage attacks on image scaling algorithms. In Proceedings of the
28th USENIX Security Symposium. 443–460.
[28] Ning Xu, Linjie Yang, Yuchen Fan, Jianchao Yang, Dingcheng Yue, Yuchen Liang,
Brian Price, Scott Cohen, and Thomas Huang. 2018. Youtube-vos: Sequence-to-
sequence video object segmentation. In Proceedings of the 14th European Confer-
ence on Computer Vision. 585–601.
A POSSIBILITY OF PSNR AS A METRIC FOR
DECAMOUFLAGE
PSNR computes the ratio between the maximum possible power of
an image and the power of corrupting noise that affects the quality
of its representation. The PSNR can be defined as follows:
𝑃𝑆𝑁𝑅 = 10 log10
( (𝐿 − 1)2
𝑀𝑆𝐸
)
(8)
where 𝐿 is the number of maximum possible intensity levels (pixel
values) of an image which then divided by the mean square root.
We found that PSNR would not be recommendable in the scal-
ing detection method presented in Section 3.1. Figure 17 shows
that the PSNR values obtained from 1000 benign images are highly
overlapped with the 1000 attack images. Therefore, we do not rec-
ommend using PSNR for the scaling detection method.
Figure 17: Histogram results of PSNR obtained from 1000
benign and 1000 attack images for the scaling detection
method in the white-box setting. The PSNR values obtained
from 1000 benign images are highly overlapped with the
1000 attack images.
Similarly, Figure 18 demonstrates that PSNR is not recommend-
able for the filtering detection method presented in Section 3.2.
Figure 18: Histogram results of PSNR obtained from 1000
benign and 1000 attack images for the filtering detection
method in the white-box setting. The PSNR values obtained
from 1000 benign images are highly overlapped with the
1000 attack images in minimum filter.
B MORE EXAMPLES FROM THE ONES THAT
GOT AWAY
Figure 19 provides more examples as misclassified as benign by
Decamouflage system. The results also suggest that while they have
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been misclassified by our system, attack image results in being
misclassified not to its targeted label by various computer vision
classifiers which means the attack loses the purpose as well.
Original vs Attack
Image
Azure
95.9% aquarium,  89.8% fish, 
89.5% invertebrate, 82.6% reef,
82.1% Marine invertebrate
96.8% abstract, 83.8% fence,
79.5% line, 74.8% art, 74.0% 
pattern, 64.5% metal
Baidu
26.7% stone crab, 25.6% brook 
crab, 16.4% square crab, 16.4% 
sand crab, 4.8% sawtooth crab
Subject not detected
Tencent
41% water, 31% fish,
13% animal
15% night
Image
Azure
99.7% reef, aquarium 98.3%, 
84.7% animal, 84.4% marine 
invertebrate, 75.4% fish
85.8% abstract, 69.6% art,
68.5% fence
Baidu
Subject not detected Subject not detected
Tencent
53.0% water, 33.0% fish, 
16.0% rock
15.0% water
Image
Azure
96.4% butterfly, 94% plant, 
86.2% indoor, 86.2% insect, 
86.1% moths and butterflies, 
77% flower, 10.1% colored
94.9% animal, 63.9% text,
16.3% fabric 
Baidu
Subject not detected Subject not detected
Tencent
24% flower, 15% branches
and leaves
16% screenshot, 13% light
Figure 19: More attack image examples that are mistakenly
accepted by Decamouflage. They have been classified as dif-
ferent objects by three computer vision classifiers (Azure,
Baidu, and Tencent). They also indicate that while those at-
tack images may pass the system, but they might also lose
the attack purpose.
C SCALING DETECTION METHOD VISUAL
SAMPLES
Figure 20 presents additional visual examples that demonstrate
the scaling detection method. Our Decamouflage system is able to
quantify the difference using both MSE and SSIM metrics.
D FILTERING DETECTION METHOD VISUAL
SAMPLES
Figure 21 presents visual examples to demonstrate the effectiveness
of the proposed filtering detection method. We are able to quantify
these results by using both MSE and SSIM metrics.
E STEGANALYSIS DETECTION METHOD
VISUAL SAMPLES
Figure 22 shows visual samples to exhibit the ability of our steganal-
ysis method to detect the attack image by producing its centered
spectrum points.
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Figure 20: More examples from our scaling detection method. They consistently show notable differences between the attack
images and upscaled images. This difference is conveniently quantified by various metrics such as MSE and SSIM.
Figure 21: More examples from our filtering detection method. The filtering mechanism especially the minimum filter con-
sistently demonstrates an ability to reveal the embedded target image within the attack image.
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Figure 22: More examples from our steganalysis detection method. We find image-scaling attack images consistently have
more than three centered spectrum points due to the abnormal perturbation of their pixels. On the other hand, the benign
image has only one centered spectrum point.
